Cooperation among cancer cells: applying game theory to cancer by Archetti, Marco & Pienta, Kenneth J.
  1 
Cooperation among cancer cells: applying game theory to cancer  
 
Marco Archetti1,2,3, Kenneth J. Pienta4 
 
1 Department of Biology, Pennsylvania State University, State College, PA, USA. 
2 The Huck Institutes of the Life Sciences, Pennsylvania State University, State College, PA, USA. 
3 School of Biological Sciences, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK.  
4 Brady Urological Institute, Johns Hopkins School of Medicine, Baltimore, MD, USA. 
 
 
Cancer cells cooperate in many of the hallmarks of cancer, within the tumor and with 
stromal cells in the microenvironment, via the secretion of diffusible factors. This 
cooperation cannot be explained simply as the collective action of cells for the benefit 
of the tumor, because non-cooperative clones can constantly invade and free-ride on 
the growth factors produced by the cooperative cells. A full understanding of 
cooperation among cancer cells requires methods and concepts from evolutionary 
game theory, which has been used successfully in other areas of biology to understand 
similar problems, but underutilized in cancer research. Game theory can provide 
insight into the stability of cooperation among cancer cells and the design of evolution-
proof therapies by disrupting this cooperation.  
 
 
Cooperation in cancer  
 
Cells within a tumor compete for space and resources, but also cooperate with one 
another, by secreting diffusible factors that promote tumor growth and invasion1-5. 
Cooperative interactions between cancer cells and with their microenvironment are 
essential for cancer progression and crucial in driving resistance to therapies6-8. Many of 
the molecules responsible for these interactions, their genes and the signalling pathways 
they activate are known, but why cells within a tumor cooperate remains unexplained. 
The “why” here relates to the adaptive advantage9-11 of cooperation: what selective 
advantage does a cell gain by cooperating (producing a growth factor)?  
The idea that cells within a tumor cooperate for the benefit of the tumor – an 
appealing and apparently reasonable explanation – is a logical fallacy that has a parallel 
in the history of evolutionary ecology, where it is known as the “group selection” 
argument12 – the idea, popular until the 1960’s that the behaviour of individuals is 
driven by the success of their group or species, a logic that evolutionary biologists now 
agree is flawed12-14. A mutation making an individual cheat, for instance by free-riding 
on shared resources produced by other cooperative individuals, would confer a 
reproductive advantage to the cheating individual and its descendants. Thus, its type 
would increase in frequency in the population over time, irrespective of the 
consequences for the population in the long term – leading to what is generally referred 
to as “tragedy of the commons” 15. In the original example, a group of herders whose 
cows graze a common land have a selfish short-term interest in putting as many cows 
as possible onto the land, even if the commons is damaged as a result, because the 
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benefit is private while the damage to the common land is shared with the entire group; 
if all herders make this selfish decision, however, the common will be degraded. 
Evolution is short-sighted, and nothing evolves for the benefit of the group, or the 
species, even if that may lead to inefficiencies and extinctions14. 
In the case of cooperation among cancer cells, a mutant cell that stopped 
producing growth factors would still benefit from the growth factors secreted by its 
neighbouring cells without paying the cost of producing it; hence that mutant clone 
would have a higher fitness and spread within the tumor. Over time, the clones 
originating from this non-producer cell should drive the original producer clone to 
extinction – a tragedy of the commons at the cellular level. Clonal selection16-18, like 
natural selection in the wild, only promotes phenotypes that increase an individual cell’s 
fitness, not the long-term benefit of the group it happens to belong to (the tumor). 
Nothing evolves for the benefit of the group – in this case, of the tumor.  
How is cooperation maintained then? This question is the source of complex 
analysis and never-ending debates in other fields, from evolutionary biology14,19-22 to 
economics23-25, but is generally glossed over in cancer biology. A full understanding of 
cooperation between cancer cells requires the application of methods and concepts from 
game theory. 
 
Game theory of cancer  
 
Evolutionary game theory. Game theory is the study of strategic interactions, that is, 
situations in which an individual’s payoff depends not only on its own behaviour but 
also on the behaviour of other individuals26-29. In other words, game theory is the study 
of optimization problems in which payoff functions are frequency-dependent, that is, 
when fitness depends not only on the (relatively stable) environment, but also on the 
changing frequencies of the other phenotypes in the population, which includes 
competitors and cooperators. Such problems are called “games”, the individuals are 
called “players,” and the behaviours are called “strategies” [Box 1].  
 In game theory applied to human behaviour, it is assumed that decisions are 
taken through rational decision-making and that payoffs corresponds to profit. In 
evolutionary game theory30-33, payoff corresponds to Darwinian fitness, and there is no 
need to assume rationality or intention: the players are replicating individuals (in this 
case cells), and strategies are phenotypes produced by mutations that differentiate one 
subclone from another within the tumor. Optimization is achieved at the population 
level via natural selection (clonal selection), which changes the frequencies of the 
strategies over time in a manner proportional to their fitness.  
While for an ecologist it is clear that natural selection in the wild is often 
frequency-dependent, in cancer research, the traditional view of carcinogenesis as a 
clonal population of cells developing all of the necessary genetic traits independently to 
form a tumor, might suggest that a genotype’s fitness is independent of its relative 
abundance. Game theory does not offer new insight into hallmarks of cancer that are 
not frequency-dependent, such as the typical genome instability and limitless replicative 
potential of cancer cells. Most of the hallmarks of cancer, however, such as self-
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sufficiency in growth signals, evading apoptosis and the immune system, 
neoangiogenesis and metastasis, depend on interactions between cancer cells or between 
cancer and stroma6-8, which are frequency-dependent. Evolutionary game theory can 
help understand these interactions.  
The simplest game describing the problem of cooperation is the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma34 (PD) [Box 2]. There is a vast literature in evolutionary biology14,19-22 and 
economics23-25 about the PD and on how, in spite of its predictions, cooperation can 
evolve because of genetic relatedness14,22 or repeated interactions over time19,21. In cancer 
research, game theory was introduced35-36 using a version of the game of Chicken37 [Box 
3]. Subsequent papers using game theory in cancer research40-49 were extensions of this 
game, and analogous games with pairwise interactions continue to be used. These, 
however, are simple models that do not capture fundamental features of cancer: most 
cases of cooperation in cancer are examples of multiplayer games, where payoffs are 
calculated from the effect of the collective interactions of many cells, rather than from 
the pairwise interactions of pairs of cells. This is because in most cases cooperation in 
cancer depends on the effect of diffusible factors. 
 
Cooperation via diffusible factors. Game theory has been applied to cancer to explain a 
variety of situations in which cancer cells cooperate with each other: the production of 
diffusible growth factors is the most straightforward example3,50-53 and the first 
empirical test3 of game theory in cancer was performed on insulin-like growth factor 
(IGF-II), which promotes proliferation and evasion of apoptosis in neuroendocrine 
pancreatic cells; similar dynamics arguably applies to other growth factors in other types 
of cancer. Other examples include the role of IDH1 mutated tumour cells in secondary 
glioblastomas44, prostate tumor growth under intermittent androgen suppression 
therapy54, metabolic mutualism between hypoxic and oxygenated cancer55, interactions 
between glycolytic acid production and angiogenesis56 and the Warburg effect 43,57,58. 
Cooperation can also be mediated by the stroma. Normal fibroblasts, for 
example, are recruited and activated by the tumor, becoming cancer-associated 
fibroblasts (CAF) and acquiring pro-tumorigenic functions, secreting growth factors 
and cytokines that sustain tumor progression59. This is a form of coercion, not 
cooperation, given that the stromal cells are recruited and activated by the cancer cells 
for their own advantage. Cancer cells, however, do cooperate with each other by 
secreting the diffusible factors that recruit and activate the fibroblasts. In other cases, 
the benefit for the tumor arises from growth factors, produced by the cancer cells, that 
promote neo-angiogenesis; or disable the immune system by activating or inhibiting a 
variety of cells6. In all these cases, cancer cells cooperate with each other, by producing 
diffusible factors that induce the stroma to provide a benefit to the tumor. Game theory 
has been used to describe tumor-stroma interactions in the production of matrix 
metalloproteinases and tissue inhibitors of metalloproteinases60, in the dynamics of 
prostate cancer progression and treatments41 and in the dynamics of multiple 
myeloma46,61,62. 
The Warburg effect63 (the switch from aerobic energy production through 
oxidative phosphorylation to anaerobic energy production through glycolysis) is another 
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example of intra-tumor cooperation that depends on diffusible factors. In some cases, a 
glycolytic subpopulation of cancer cells under hypoxia will release lactate as a by-
product, thus fueling a subpopulation of cancer cells producing energy through oxidative 
phosphorylation64. The Warburg effect, however, is not merely an adaptation to 
hypoxia, and can occur even under normal oxygen concentrations65. In fact, its main 
function may be the acidification of the microenvironment through its diffusible 
byproducts66-69, which promotes the death of normal cells, facilitates tumour 
invasiveness, has immunosuppressive effects, and stimulates release of growth factors. 
The cooperative nature of the Warburg effect is clear: energy production through 
glycolysis is less efficient for a cell than through oxidative phosphorylation (when 
oxygen is not limited) but induces a beneficial effect for the tumour as a whole: the 
acidification of the microenvironment brought about by the diffusible metabolites 
produced by cooperative (glycolytic) cells43,44,57,58. Cancer cells can even promote the 
Warburg effect in neighboring CAFs, a process referred to as the "reverse Warburg 
effect"70; these CAFs then secrete metabolites that can be used by cancer cells and 
oxidized for energy production71, promoting tumor growth and metastasis72.  
Cooperation among cancer cells, therefore, occurs whenever diffusible 
molecules, with autocrine and paracrine effects, affect the survival and proliferation of 
the tumor. The production of growth factors that promote proliferation or angiogenesis, 
or that help evade apoptosis or the immune system, are examples of cooperation, among 
the cancer cells or between tumor cells and stroma. Cooperation can also be brought 
about by other diffusible factors, other than growth factors, such as the metabolites 
produced by the Warburg effect (discussed above) or small molecules that promote 
tissue invasion and metastasis: macrophages and mesenchymal stem cells contribute to 
the epithelial-mesenchymal transition at primary sites by secreting molecules that allow 
tumor cells to separate from neighbouring epithelial cell-cell contacts and acquire a 
mobile and invasive phenotype73; macrophages also help intravasation74; in the 
circulation, platelets protect cancer cells from cytotoxic immune cell recognition75 and 
at secondary sites the integrins they produce mediate attachment to the endothelium76; 
platelets produced by macrophages induce protection against apoptosis77 and the 
fibronectin produced by the CAFs promotes extravasation78; at secondary sites, CAFs 
produce factors that help direct metastatic dissemination, while myeloid-derived 
suppressor cells and natural killer cells create a microenvironment that helps tumor 
colonization79. 
Most of these instances of cooperation among cancer cells and between tumor 
and stroma, brought about by diffusible factors, are examples of what game theorists 
call “public goods games”80,81: players (cells) can contribute (by secreting diffusible 
factors) to a public good. A public good is any good that leads to a benefit for a group 
– cooperators and defectors alike. In the case of cancer cells the benefit is proliferation, 
protection against apoptosis or the immune system, acidification of the 
microenvironment, or invasion and metastasis (Figure 1). The effect of the 
contributions can be direct or mediated by the stroma. A strategy, in this context, can 
be defined by the amount of diffusible factor produced by the cell. 
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A situation analogous to mutualism in ecology82 can arise if two or more different 
clones produce one (or more) type of diffusible factor each and rely on each other for 
the provision of the other factor(s)2,4. But cooperation often evolves even when there is 
no interdependence, i.e., one clone produces one or more diffusible factors and another 
clone does not produce any, or a lower amount - the defector cells have a free ride on 
the diffusible factors provided by cooperative cells3. What prevents defector cells from 
spreading within the tumor? This is the essence of the problem we need to explain. 
 
Direct interactions. Other types of interactions occur via transmembrane molecules, such 
as cell-cell adhesion, where fitness depends on a cell’s own phenotypes, as well as the 
phenotype of their immediate one-step neighbours (the cells that are in direct contact). 
Cooperating for the production of cell-cell adhesion molecules enables cells to stick 
together, and even if one cell stops producing adhesion molecules it is kept in place by 
adjacent cells. Multi-cell interactions represent a public goods game, in which a cell 
interacts only with its immediate neighbours, rather than with other cells within a 
diffusion range, and a benefit (cell adhesion) is achieved if at least one cell cooperates, 
a game known as a Volunteer’s Dilemma83,84 (if the adhesion molecules produced by 
one cell are enough to keep a non-cooperative cell in place; if more than one co-operator 
is required, the game is a threshold public goods game80,81,83,84).  While interactions in 
this case do not involve diffusible factors, the game is still a type of public goods game, 
in which a benefit is achieved with a threshold of one (or more) cooperator. Here, 
however, intra-tumor cooperation is clinically desirable (because it prevents metastases), 
whereas in most other cases of public goods, cancer therapy should aim at impairing 
cooperation.  
In other cases, although more rarely, interactions can take the form of a pairwise 
game (a game with only two players). Cells within tumors do not normally interact in 
pairs simply because they are surrounded by more than one cell. Even in monolayers, 
the average number of neighbouring cells is 6 (fewer than 4 or more than 9 neighbours 
occurs rarely51), and the number of neighbours increases in three dimensions. A special 
case in which interaction are actually pairwise, but among multiple players (interacting 
sequentially in pairs), may occur in cell-cell competition85,86 and in cell-induced 
apoptosis promoted, for instance, by FAS (CD95) ligands87. A common assumption is 
that a higher efficiency of FAS ligand production would always lead to an advantage in 
proliferation. Game theory suggests that this might not be necessarily true – the cells 
with the lowest efficiency could have a higher fitness, and different types could be 
maintained in the tumor – two results that seem counterintuitive and are difficult to 
grasp without game theory [Box 4]. 
The vast majority of the interactions we have discussed, however, are examples 
of multiplayer collective action problems for the production of public goods. How is 
cooperation possible here? 
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The logic of cooperation 
 
Public goods games. In a public goods game80,81, individuals in a group can decide to 
cooperate or defect; all members of the group receive a benefit from the fact that the 
group (the tumor) does well, but only the cooperators pay a small cost from contributing 
to the collective benefit, whereas defectors do not pay this cost (or pay less). One way 
to calculate how much each individual benefits from the enhanced group benefit, is to 
sum all the contributions, multiply the result by an enhancement factor, and then 
redistribute it equally to all players, including the defectors. In this game, which is called 
the N-person Prisoner’s Dilemma (NPD) 90,91, it is easy to see that free-riding on the 
contribution of other group members (i.e. ‘defecting’) is the strategy most favoured by 
natural selection. Contributing cells do get their share of the group benefit, but 
defecting cells get their share plus the savings from not having contributed to the group 
benefit. Defecting cells thus enjoy a higher fitness and make up a larger proportion of 
the tumor in the next generation, resulting in fewer cells contributing to the group 
benefit until, eventually, only defecting cells are left, and nobody contributes to the 
group benefit. In short, the inexorable logic of the NPD is the extinction of cooperators 
– the “tragedy of the commons” 15. 
There is a vast literature19-25 in evolutionary biology and economics about how, 
in spite of this prediction, cooperation can evolve. Explanations fall into two main 
categories: genetic relatedness or repeated interactions. Genetic relatedness enables 
cooperators to provide benefits to their own kin, hence helping their own genes; 
repeated interactions allow reciprocation (punishment of defectors or rewards for 
cooperators). Essentially, both are forms of positive assortment: cooperation can evolve 
when a cooperative type interacts preferentially with other cooperative types. 
Some results that already exist in the evolutionary game theory literature can be 
applied to game theory of cancer. For instance, theory predicts92 that when cooperation 
affects the probability of reproduction, it evolves under less strict conditions than when 
it affects the probability of surviving death. In the context of cooperation among cancer 
cells, this would imply that cooperation for the production of growth factors that 
promote proliferation is more likely than cooperation for growth factors that promote 
resistance to apoptosis. 
This and other existing results, however, are based on the NPD, and make a 
crucial assumption that is not valid in cancer biology: linear (additive) effects. Diffusible 
factors in tumors have, in fact, non-linear effects. In general, the effect of biological 
molecules, including growth factors, is a sigmoid function of their concentration93: the 
effect of each contribution is not simply added in a linear way, but it has synergistic 
effects at first and then diminishing returns, as observed in a logistic curve. Nonlinear 
games are notoriously difficult to analyse, but using linear games like the NPD can lead 
to misleading results80, hence evolutionary game theory of linear public goods games 
cannot be simply applied to cancer biology. New methods94,95 have been developed 
recently that enable analysis for many types of non-linearities, including sigmoid benefit 
functions encompassing the effect of most types of growth factors.  
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Predictions and tests. The theory of non-linear public goods suggests that clones that 
produce different amounts of growth factors can be maintained in a stable polymorphic 
equilibrium, even though defectors do not pay the cost of contributing to the public 
good, because at intermediate frequencies of producers, due to non-linear effects, 
cooperating confers a higher fitness than defecting [Figure 2]3,50-53. It is important to 
notice that the maintenance of cooperation has nothing to do with the benefit of the 
tumor: players do not cooperate because cooperation improves the overall fitness of the 
group (indeed, the maximum benefit for the group is not at the achieved equilibrium 
but requires a higher fraction of producers3 – the equilibrium is inefficient). Rather, 
self-interested players (cells) cooperate when that is convenient for them to do so, that 
is, when the marginal benefit of cooperating (the difference in benefit compared to a 
defector) is higher than its relative cost/benefit ratio (in Figure 2, where the fitness of 
cooperation is higher than the fitness of defection).  
Note that, while a cooperative population can be invaded by defector mutants, a 
population of defector cells cannot be invaded by a cooperative mutant, because the 
benefit of cooperation is shared among all players, but the cost a cooperator pays is a 
private cost. Hence, both pure defection and a mixture of co-operators and defectors 
are stable outcomes, and their occurrence depends also on the initial composition of the 
population. Well-known features of cancer, like intra-tumor heterogeneity, the 
inefficiency of metastasis, the inefficiency of establishing cell lines from single clones, 
and the low plating efficiency of single cells are all compatible with this bi-stable 
dynamics. 
The stable heterogeneous equilibrium can be achieved if the cost of producing 
the growth factor is low enough compared to the benefit it confers. The critical 
cost/benefit depends on the diffusion range of the molecules secreted and on the shape 
of its effect as a function of its concentration3,50-53. Not surprisingly, cooperation evolves 
more easily when the cost is low (and disappears entirely above the critical threshold). 
This prediction has been confirmed using experimental tests of the theory in pancreatic 
cancer cells3, where the cost/benefit ratio can be manipulated experimentally by titrating 
the amount of exogenous growth factors available to the cells. The collapse of 
cooperation may be happening naturally all the time within tumors since only a tiny 
minority of cancers actually develop enough to become clinically relevant96,97. The few 
tumors that actually manage to develop stable cooperation may thus be the exception, 
rather than the rule.  
Cooperation also evolves more easily if the diffusion range is low and if the 
benefit function is steep (more specifically, a steep function enables cooperation for a 
higher value of the critical cost, but it also makes cooperation less robust to random 
fluctuations52,94). These parameters can be estimated in cell populations, and the 
dynamics of the system – the number and types of equilibria and how the population 
changes in response to changes in these parameters – can be predicted. Other empirical 
results related to the theory, however, are still rare, and experiments done specifically to 
test the theory are even less common. The diffusion range of growth factors, a crucial 
parameter of the models, remains difficult to estimate. In addition, there is no 
comprehensive view of how important each growth factor is for each tumor type – 
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information about these combinations is scattered through the literature. With the 
development of new technologies to engineer cells, it is now easier to produce non-
cooperative clones by knocking out genes for growth factors and use them in 
competition/cooperation experiments with their original producer cells3.  
More interactions between theory and experiments are also needed, to link the 
large amount of data already existing in cancer research, as well as the ability to 
manipulate and measure clonal selection in cancer cell populations, to models of 
evolutionary game theory. For example, a recent study showed interdependence 
between two clones within a tumor4, which resembles mutualism for the exchange of 
diffusible goods between cells, while a model of essentially the same system (two types 
of players trading two different public goods)98 was published almost at the same time 
in evolutionary biology. In this and other cases, clearly a mutual awareness between 
theoretical results in game theory and empirical results in cancer research would be 
beneficial.  
 
Impairing cooperation 
 
Many modern targeted therapies try to impair intra-tumor cooperation by neutralising 
growth factors or their receptors. However, even the most successful targeted therapies 
generally lead to relapse. While therapies that target the stroma, like immunotherapies, 
may be less susceptible to the evolution of resistance because stromal cells are not 
genetically unstable like cancer cells7,99, mutants that are not susceptible to a therapy 
can arise in the population of cancer cells, and spread by clonal selection, even when 
therapies seem effective in the short term. Evolution-proof therapies – therapies not 
prone to the evolution of resistant clones – are needed. Unfortunately, considerations 
on equilibria and dynamics are rarely, if ever, taken into account in the design of 
therapies100.  
Game theory deals with the core problem of the evolution of resistance: the 
stability of equilibria and the dynamics of perturbations. Mechanism design, or reverse 
game theory, in economics and ecology generally aims at devising ways to improve 
efficiency among rational self-interested individuals. In cancer research, the equivalent 
of mechanism design is the design of an effective therapy. 
An example of the use of concepts from game theory in the design of therapies 
is the idea of changing the dosage of drugs in order to enable or promote cell-cell 
competition. Rather than targeting a tumor with the highest dose tolerated by the 
patient, it might be beneficial to reduce the dosage to enable competition between 
cancer clones, which can prevent or slow down the development of resistance – an idea 
(“adaptive therapy”101-104) that has parallels in the field of infectious diseases105-109. Other 
ideas include changing the selection pressure in a tumour such that the more benign (or 
easier to treat) clones within the tumor would be selected for (“sucker’s gambit”110); or 
to use two therapies with synergistic effects such that cancer cells evolving to elude one 
will become more susceptible to the other (“double bind” 111-113).  
While these approaches suggest exploiting the interactions between different 
clones within the tumor (and highlight the importance of finding the right balance of 
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attack and the right sequence of treatments), they do not specifically target cooperation. 
An example of the use of game theory of cooperation in the analysis of the stability of 
therapies, is the case of tumor-stroma interactions in multiple myeloma, where 
osteoblasts, osteoclasts and malignant plasma cells are players in a public goods 
game46,61,66. It has been shown that reducing the amount of malignant plasma cells (the 
current approach to treating multiple myeloma) is not an evolutionarily stable strategy, 
whereas changing the parameters of the game, for instance by targeting the growth 
factors produced by the stroma and by the tumor, could lead to the extinction of the 
malignant cells and re-establish a healthy osteoblast-osteoclast balance.  
Targeted therapies aim at impairing cooperation among cancer cells by targeting 
growth factors or their receptors. It has been suggested that therapies that target 
diffusible factors are a more evolutionarily robust approach (less susceptible to the 
evolution of resistance) than conventional drugs that target cells directly114-117 because 
growth factors do not confer a private advantage to a mutant, resistant clone but to the 
whole population of cells. Although this is a valid point, resistance against targeted 
therapies, does evolve. Game theory shows50,53 that an effective targeted therapy must 
be extremely efficient in order to be evolutionarily stable. A therapy that reduces the 
amount of available growth factor increases the amount of growth factors that cells must 
produce to achieve the pre-treatment fitness level (because some of the ligands are 
impaired by the therapy); in the short term this makes tumor growth decline because 
there is not enough ligand available; but in the long term, the dynamics of the system 
changes: unless the speed and efficacy of the initial reduction is high enough, the 
population will evolve to a new equilibrium with an even higher production of growth 
factor50,53.  
Rather than targeting the ligands or receptors, one possible alternative, inspired 
by the very logic of the dynamics of growth factor production, is to use cell therapy: 
engineering tumor cells by knocking out the genes coding for essential growth factors; 
when re-inserted within the original tumour, these modified cells would have a 
proliferation advantage, because they could free-ride on the growth factors produced by 
the original cells (“autologous cell defection”53,118) and would therefore spread by clonal 
selection, like a tumour within the tumour. Eventually a tumour made of all defector 
cells would collapse for lack of essential growth factors, or at least reduce the deleterious 
effect of cytokine overproduction – which is among the immediate causes of death for 
a patient119. 
 This approach would harness clonal selection to our advantage: rather than 
leading to relapse, clonal selection would lead to the spread of the non-growth-factor-
producing clone, leading to the collapse of intra-tumor cooperation – a tragedy of the 
commons at the cellular level. (This may be happening naturally all the time within 
tumors since only a tiny minority of cancers actually develop enough to become clinically 
relevant96; the few tumors that actually manage to develop stable cooperation may thus 
be the exception, rather than the rule). By harnessing the power of clonal selection, 
autologous cell defection would be self-promoting. In contrast, current forms of therapy 
have the opposite effect because they confer a proliferation advantage to clones that are 
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immune to the treatment, and hence eventually enable the tumor to grow again and 
lead to relapse.  
There would be, of course, difficulties to overcome. The constitutive activation 
of a downstream pathway could make a growth factor irrelevant (like with current 
targeted therapies), although this would be a problem only for growth factors that affect 
proliferation, not other hallmarks of cancer, and could be mitigated by knocking out 
multiple growth factors (hence multiple pathways). The cost of growth factor 
production must be high enough to drive producer cells to extinction, and the knockout 
clone must expand quickly within the tumor; cooperation is more susceptible to collapse 
when growth factors have a high diffusion range and when they affect proliferation 
rather than apoptosis. Game theory can be used to predict the critical costs and speed 
necessary to achieve the collapse of cooperation, and these predictions can be tested in 
vitro3; similar tests in vivo must be developed. 
In spite of all the incredibly challenging and inevitable technical difficulties, 
these are examples of how thinking in terms of dynamics and equilibria may lead to 
alternative approaches that have not been fully considered so far. There are certainly 
more.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Cooperation is a fundamental force in populations subject to natural selection, including 
clonal selection, and it has been noted120 that the major transitions in evolution are 
different ways of overcoming the problem of cooperation between self-interested 
entities, from cells within a body to individuals in a society. Cooperation, however, is 
not inevitable – indeed, stable cooperation between selfish individuals is rare and 
fragile14,15. Only a small minority of cancer cells develop into malignancies96, and it 
stands to reason that these are the ones that have successfully managed to evolve 
cooperation. Understanding how to impair cooperation and harness clonal selection can 
provide insight into the design of evolution-proof therapies.  
  
 
 
  
  11 
References  
 
1. Jouanneau, J., Moens, G., Bourgeois, Y., Poupon, M.F. & Thiery, J.P. A minority 
of carcinoma cells producing acidic fibroblast growth factor induces a community 
effect for tumor progression. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 91, 286–290 (1994) 
2. Axelrod, R., Axelrod, D. & Pienta, K.J. Evolution of cooperation among tumor 
cells. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 103, 13474-13479 (2006) 
3. Archetti, M., Ferraro, D.A. & Christofori, G. Heterogeneity for IGF-II 
production maintained by public goods dynamics in neuroendocrine pancreatic cancer. 
Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 112, 1833-1838 (2015) 
4. Cleary, A.S., Leonard, T.L., Gestl, S.A. & Gunther, E.J. (2014) Tumour cell 
heterogeneity maintained by cooperating subclones in Wnt-driven mammary cancers. 
Nature 508, 113-117 (2014) 
5. Tabassum, D.P. & Polyak, K. Tumorigenesis: it takes a village. Nat. Rev.Cancer 8, 
473-483 (2015) 
6. Joyce, J.A. & Pollard, J.W. Microenvironmental regulation of metastasis. Nat. Rev. 
Cancer 9, 239–252 (2009) 
7. Quail, D.F. & Joyce, J.A. Microenvironmental regulation of tumor progression and 
metastasis, Nature Medicine 19, 1423-1437 (2013) 
8. Hanahan, D. & Coussens, L.M. Accessories to the crime: functions of cells 
recruited to the tumor microenvironment. Cancer Cell 21, 309–322 (2012) 
9. MacDougall-Shackleton, S.A. The levels of analysis revisited. Philosophical Trans. 
Royal Soc. B: Biological Sciences 366, 2076–2085 (2011) 
10. Mayr, E. Cause and effect in biology. Science 134, 1501–1506 (1961) 
11. Tinbergen, N. On aims and methods in ethology. Z. Tierpsychol. 20, 410–433 
(1963) 
12. Maynard Smith, J. Group selection and kin selection. Nature 201, 1145–1147 
(1964) 
13. Williams, G.C. Adaptation and natural selection: a critique of some current 
evolutionary thought. Princeton University Press (1972) 
14. Dawkins, R. The selfish gene. Oxford University Press (1976) 
15. Hardin, G. The tragedy of the commons. Science 162, 1243–1248 (1968) 
16. Nowell, P.C. The clonal evolution of tumor cell populations. Science 194, 23-28 
(1976) 
17. Cairns, J. Mutation, selection and the natural history of cancer. Nature 255, 197–
200 (1975) 
18. Greaves, M. & Maley, C.C. Clonal evolution in cancer. Nature 481, 306-313 
(2012) 
19. Axelrod, R. & Hamilton, W.D. The evolution of cooperation. Science 211, 1390–
1396 (1981) 
20. Mesterton-Gibbons, M. & Adams, E.S. The economics of animal cooperation. 
Science 298, 2146–2147 (2002) 
21. Nowak, M.A. Five rules for the evolution of cooperation. Science 314, 1560–1563 
(2006) 
  12 
22. West, S.A., Griffin, A.S. & Gardner, A. Evolutionary explanations for 
cooperation. Current Biology. 17, R661–R672 (2007) 
23. Gintis, H. & Bowles, S. A cooperative species: human reciprocity and its evolution. 
Princeton University Press (2011) 
24. Tomasello, M. Why we cooperate. MIT Press (2009)  
25. Axelrod, R. The evolution of cooperation, Basic Books (1984) 
26. Rasmusen, E. Games and information. An introduction to game theory. Wiley-
Blackwell (2006) 
27. Osborne, M. An introduction to game theory. Oxford University Press (2003) 
28. Fudenberg, D. & Tirole, J. Game theory. The MIT Press (1991) 
29. Myerson, R. Game theory: analysis of conflict. Harvard University Press (1997) 
30. Maynard Smith, J. Evolution and the theory of games. Cambridge University Press 
(1982) 
31. McElreath, R. & Boyd, R. Mathematical models of social evolution: a guide for the 
perplexed. University of Chicago Press (2007) 
32. Dugatkin, L. & Reeve, H. Game theory and animal behaviour. Oxford University 
Press (1998) 
33. Hofbauer, J. & Sigmund, K. Evolutionary games and population dynamics. 
Cambridge University Press (1998) 
34. Tucker, A. A two-person dilemma (1950). In: Readings in Games and Information, 
ed. by Rasmusen, E., pp. 7-8. Blackwell, Oxford (2001), 
35. Tomlinson, I.P. Game-theory models of interactions between tumour cells. Eur. J. 
Cancer 33, 1495–1500 (1997) 
36. Tomlinson, I.P. & Bodmer, W.F. Modelling consequences of interactions 
between tumour cells. Br. J. Cancer 75, 157–160 (1997) 
37. Rapoport, A., Chammah, A.M. The game of chicken. American Behavioral 
Scientist 10, 10-28 (1966) 
38. Sugden, R. The economics of rights, cooperation and welfare. Blackwell, Oxford 
(1986) 
39. Maynard Smith, J. & Price, G.R. The logic of animal conflict. Nature 246, 15–18 
(1973) 
40. Bach, L.A., Bentzen, S., Alsner, J. & Christiansen, F.B. An evolutionary-game 
model of tumour cell interactions, possible relevance to gene therapy. Eur. J. Cancer 
37, 2116–2120 (2001)  
41. Bach, L.A., Sumpter, D.J.T., Alsner, J., Loeschke, V. Spatial evolutionary games 
of interaction among generic cancer cells. J. Theor. Med. 5, 47–58 (2003) 
42. Basanta, D., Hatzikirou, H. & Deutsch, A. Studying the emergence of 
invasiveness in tumours using game theory. Eur. Phys. J. 63, 393–397 (2008) 
43. Basanta, D., Simon, M., Hatzikirou, H. & Deutsch, A. Evolutionary game theory 
elucidates the role of glycolysis in glioma progression and invasion. Cell Prolif. 41, 
980–987 (2008) 
44. Basanta, D., Scott, J.G., Rockne, R., Swanson, K.R. & Anderson, A.R. The role 
of IDH1 mutated tumour cells in secondary glioblastomas, an evolutionary game 
theoretical view. Phys. Biol. 8, 015016 (2011) 
  13 
45. Basanta, D. et al. Investigating prostate cancer tumour-stroma interactions, 
clinical and biological insights from an evolutionary game. Br. J. Cancer 106, 174–181 
(2012) 
46. Dingli, D., Chalub, F.A., Santos, F.C., Pacheco, J. Cancer phenotype as the 
outcome of an evolutionary game between normal and malignant cells. Br. J. Cancer 
101, 1130–1136 (2009) 
47. Gerstung, M., Nakhoul, H., Beerenwinkel, N. Evolutionary games with affine 
fitness functions, applications to cancer. Dyn. Games Appl. 1, 370–385 (2011) 
48. You, L. & al. Spatial vs. non-spatial eco-evolutionary dynamics in a tumor growth 
model. J. Theor. Biol. 435, 78–97 (2017) 
49. Zhang, J.S., Cunningham, J.J., Brown, J.S., Gatenby, R.A. Integrating 
evolutionary dynamics into treatment of metastatic castrate-resistant prostate cancer. 
Nat. Commun. 8, 1816 (2017) 
50. Archetti, M. Dynamics of growth factor production in monolayers of cancer cells. 
Evol. Appl. 6, 1146–1159 (2013) 
51. Archetti, M. Cooperation among cancer cells as public goods games on Voronoi 
networks. J. Theor. Biol. 396, 191–203 (2016)  
52. Archetti, M. Stable heterogeneity for the production of diffusible factors in cell 
populations. PLoS ONE 9, e108526 (2014) 
53. Archetti, M. Evolutionary game theory of growth factor production, implications 
for tumor heterogeneity and resistance to therapies. Br. J. Cancer 109, 1056–1062 
(2013) 
54. Yang, J., Zhao, TJ., Yuan, CQ., Xie, JH. & Hao, FF. A nonlinear competitive 
model of the prostate tumor growth under intermittent androgen suppression. J. 
Theor. Biol. 404, 66-72 (2016) 
55. Kianercy, A., Veltri, R. & Pienta, KJ. Critical transitions in a game theoretic 
model of tumour metabolism. Interface Focus 4, 20140014 (2014) 
56. Kaznatcheev, A., Vander Velde, R., Scott, J.G., Basanta, D. Cancer treatment 
scheduling and dynamic heterogeneity in social dilemmas of tumour acidity and 
vasculature. Br J Cancer. 116, 785-792 (2017) 
57. Archetti, M. Evolutionary dynamics of the Warburg effect, glycolysis as a 
collective action problem among cancer cells. J. Theor. Biol. 341, 1–8 (2014) 
58. Archetti, M. Heterogeneity and proliferation of invasive cancer subclones in game 
theory models of the Warburg effect. Cell Prolif. 482, 259–269 (2015) 
59. Cirri, P. & Chiarugi, P. Cancer associated fibroblasts: the dark side of the coin. 
Am. J. Cancer Res 1, 482-497 (2011) 
60. Sartakhti, JS., Manshaei, MH. & Sadeghi, M. MMP-TIMP interactions in 
cancer invasion: An evolutionary game-theoretical framework. J. Theor. Biol. 412, 17-
26 (2017) 
61. Sartakhti, J.S., Manshaei, M.H. & Archetti, M. (2018) Game theory of tumor–
stroma interactions in multiple myeloma: effect of nonlinear benefits. Games 9, 32 
62. Sartakhti, J.S., Manshaei, M.H., Bateni, S. & Archetti, M. Evolutionary 
dynamics of tumor-stroma interactions in multiple myeloma. PLoS ONE 11(12), 
e0168856 (2016) 
  14 
63. Warburg, O. Ueber den stoffwechsel der tumoren. Constable, London (1930) 
64. Nakajima, E.C. & Van Houten, B. Metabolic symbiosis in cancer: refocusing the 
Warburg lens. Mol. Carcinog. 52, 329–337 (2013)  
65. Cairns, R.A., Harris, I.S., Mak, T.W. Regulation of cancer cell metabolism. Nat 
Rev Cancer. 11, 85-95 (2011) 
66. Gatenby, R.& Gillies, R.J. Why do cancers have high aerobic glycolysis? Nature 
Reviews Cancer 4, 891-899 (2004) 
67. Gatenby, R. & Gillies, R.J. Glycolysis in cancer: a potential target for therapy. Int. 
J. Biochem. Cell Biol. 39, 1358–1366 (2007) 
68. Gatenby, R.A. & Gawlinski, E.T. A reaction-diffusion model of cancer invasion. 
Cancer Res. 56, 5745–5753 (1996) 
69. Gatenby, R.A. & Gawlinski, E.T. The glycolytic phenotype in carcinogenesis and 
tumor invasion: insights through mathematical models. Cancer Res. 63, 3847–3854 
(2003) 
70. Pavlides, S., et al. The reverse Warburg effect: aerobic glycolysis in cancer 
associated fibroblasts and the tumor stroma. Cell Cycle 8, 3984–4001 (2009) 
71. Bonuccelli, G., et al. Ketones and lactate "fuel" tumor growth and metastasis: 
evidence that epithelial cancer cells use oxidative mitochondrial metabolism. Cell Cycle 
9, 3506–3514 (2010) 
72. Xing, Y., Zhao, S., Zhou, B.P. & Mi, J. Metabolic reprogramming of the tumour 
microenvironment. FEBS J 282, 3892–3898 (2015) 
73. Thiery, J.P., Acloque, H., Huang, R.Y. & Nieto, M.A. Epithelial-mesenchymal 
transitions in development and disease. Cell 139, 871–890 (2009)  
74. Sidani, M., Wyckoff, J., Xue, C., Segall, J.E. & Condeelis, J. Probing the 
microenvironment of mammary tumors using multiphoton microscopy. J. Mammary 
Gland Biol. Neoplasia 11, 151–163 (2006) 
75. Gay, L.J. & Felding-Habermann, B. Contribution of platelets to tumour 
metastasis. Nat. Rev. Cancer 11, 123–134 (2011) 
76. Ruggeri, Z.M. & Mendolicchio, G.L. Adhesion mechanisms in platelet function. 
Circ. Res. 100, 1673–1685 (2007) 
77. Chen, Q., Zhang, X.H. & Massague, J. Macrophage binding to receptor VCAM-
1 transmits survival signals in breast cancer cells that invade the lungs. Cancer Cell 20, 
538–549 (2011) 
78. Kaplan, R.N. et al. VEGFR1-positive haematopoietic bone marrow progenitors 
initiate the pre-metastatic niche. Nature 438, 820–827 (2005). 
79. Psaila, B. & Lyden, D. The metastatic niche: adapting the foreign soil. Nat. Rev. 
Cancer 9, 285–293 (2009). 
80. Archetti, M. et al. Economic game theory for mutualism and cooperation. Ecology 
Letters 14, 1300-1312 (2011) 
81. Archetti, M. & Scheuring, I. Review: Game theory of public goods in one-shot 
social dilemmas without assortment. J. Theor. Biol. 299, 9–20 (2012) 
82. Aktipis, A. (2016). Principles of cooperation across systems: from human sharing 
to multicellularity and cancer. Evolutionary Applications 9, 17–36. 
  15 
83. Archetti, M. The volunteer's dilemma and the optimal size of a social group. J. 
Theor. Biol. 261, 475-480 (2009) 
84. Archetti, M. Cooperation as a volunteer's dilemma and the strategy of conflict in 
public goods games. J. Evol. Biol. 22, 2192-2200 (2009) 
85. Moreno, E. Is cell competition relevant to cancer? Nat. Rev. Cancer. 8, 141-147 
(2008)  
86. Merino, M.M., Levayer, R. & Moreno, E. Survival of the fittest: essential roles of 
cell competition in development, aging, and cancer. Trends Cell Biol. 26, 776-788 
(2016)  
87. Peter, M.E., et al. The role of CD95 and CD95 ligand in cancer. Cell Death and 
Differentiation 22, 549-559 (2015) 
88. Shubik, M. Does the fittest necessarily survive? In Readings in Game Theory and 
Political Behavior (Shubik M. ed.) 43-46. Doubleday, Garden City NJ (1954) 
89. Archetti, M. Survival of the weakest in N-person duels and the maintenance of 
variation under constant selection. Evolution 66, 637-650 (2012) 
90. Fox, J. & Guyer, M. Public choice and cooperation in N-person prisoner's 
dilemma. Journal of Conflict Resolution 22, 469-481 (1978) 
91. Hamburger, H. N-person prisoner’s dilemma. Journal of Mathematical Sociology 3, 
27-48 (1973)  
92. Grafen, A. & Archetti, M. Natural selection of altruism in inelastic homogeneous 
viscous populations. J. Theor. Biol. 252, 694-710 (2008) 
93. Cornish-Bowden, A. Fundamentals of enzyme kinetics. Wiley Blackwell (2012) 
94. Archetti, M. & Scheuring, I. Coexistence of cooperation and defection in public 
goods games. Evolution 65, 1140-1148 (2011) 
95. Archetti, M. How to analyze models of nonlinear public goods. Games 9, 17 
(2018) 
96. de Groot, A.E., Roy, S., Brown, J.S., Pienta, K.J. & Amend, S.R. Revisiting seed 
and soil: examining the primary tumor and cancer cell foraging in metastasis. Mol 
Cancer Res. 15, 361-370 (2017)  
97. Nagy, J.D. (2004) Competition and natural selection in a mathematical model of 
cancer. Bull Math Biol 66, 663-687 
98. Archetti, M. & Scheuring, I. Trading public goods stabilizes interspecific 
mutualism. J. Theor. Biol. 318, 58-67 (2013) 
99. Valkenburg, K.C., de Groot, A.E., Pienta, K.J. Targeting the tumour stroma to 
improve cancer therapy. Nature Reviews Clinical Oncology. 15, 366-381 (2018) 
100. Aktipis, C.A., Kwan, V.S.Y., Johnson, K.A., Neuberg, S.L. & Maley, C.C. 
Overlooking evolution: a systematic analysis of cancer relapse and therapeutic 
resistance research. PLoS ONE 6, e26100 (2011) 
101. Gillies, R.J., Verduzco, D. & Gatenby, R.A. Evolutionary dynamics of 
carcinogenesis and why targeted therapy does not work. Nat Rev Cancer. 12, 487–493 
(2012) 
102. Gatenby, R.A. A change of strategy in the war on cancer. Nature 459, 508–509 
(2009) 
  16 
103. Gatenby, R.A., Silva, A.S., Gillies, R.J. & Frieden, B.R. Adaptive therapy. 
Cancer Res. 69, 4894– 4903 (2009) 
104. Enriquez-Navas, P.M., et al. Exploiting evolutionary principles to prolong tumor 
control in preclinical models of breast cancer. Sci Transl Med. 8, 327ra24 (2016) 
105. Read, A.F., Day, T. & Huijben, S. The evolution of drug resistance and the 
curious orthodoxy of aggressive chemotherapy. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA. 108, 10871–
10877 (2011) 
106. Day, T., Huijben, V. & Read, A.F. Is selection relevant in the evolutionary 
emergence of drug resistance? Trends Microbiol. 23, 126–133 (2015)  
107. Day, T. & Read, AF. Does high-dose antimicrobial chemotherapy prevent the 
evolution of resistance? PLoS Comput Biol. 12, e1004689 (2016) 
108. Martin, R., Fisher, M., Minchin, R., Teo, K. Low-intensity combination 
chemotherapy maximizes host survival time for tumors containing drug-resistant cells. 
Math Biosci. 110, 221–152 (1992)  
109. Hansen, E., Woods, R.J., Read, A.F. How to use a chemotherapeutic agent 
when resistance to it threatens the patient. PLoS Biol 15, e2001110 (2017) 
110. Merlo, L.M.F., Pepper, J.W., Reid, B.J., Maley, C.C. Cancer as an evolutionary 
and ecological process. Nat. Rev. Cancer 6, 924–935 (2006) 
111. Silva, A.S., Gatenby, R.A. A theoretical quantitative model for evolution of 
cancer chemotherapy resistance. Biol. Direct. 5, 25 (2010) 
112. Gatenby, R.A., Gillies, R.J., Brown, J.S. The evolutionary dynamics of cancer 
prevention. Nat. Rev. Cancer 10, 526–527 (2010) 
113. Basanta, D., Gatenby, R.A. & Anderson, A.R. An exploiting evolution to treat 
drug resistance: combination therapy and the double bind. Mol. Pharmaceut. 9, 914–
921 (2012) 
114. Aktipis, C.A. & Nesse, R.M. Evolutionary foundations for cancer biology. 
Evolutionary Applications 6, 144–159 (2013) 
115. André, J.B., Godelle, B. Multicellular organization in bacteria as a target for drug 
therapy. Ecology Letters 8, 800–810 (2005) 
116. Pepper, J.W. Drugs that target pathogen public goods are robust against evolved 
drug resistance. Evolutionary Applications 5, 757–761 (2012) 
117. Jansen, G., Gatenby, R., & Aktipis, C. A. Opinion: Control vs. eradication: 
applying infectious disease treatment strategies to cancer. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 112, 
937–938 (2015) 
118. Archetti, M. Evolutionarily stable anti-cancer therapies by autologous cell 
defection. Evol. Med. Public Health 1, 161–172 (2013) 
119. Loberg, R.D., Bradley, D.A., Tomlins, S.A., Chinnaiyan, A.M. & Pienta, K.J. 
The lethal phenotype of cancer: the molecular basis of death due to malignancy. CA 
Cancer J Clin 57, 225-241 (2007) 
120. Maynard Smith, J. & Szathmáry, E. The major transitions in evolution. Oxford, 
England: Oxford University Press (1995) 
 
 
  
  17 
Figure 1. Cooperative interactions within the tumor and with the stroma. A: Two 
cancer clones (blue and cyan) exchanging mutually beneficial growth factors. B: One 
cancer clone providing a growth factor to itself and to another, non-producer clone 
(yellow). C: Cancer cells providing cytokines to the stroma (pink), which becomes 
activated (purple) and provides growth factors to the tumor. D: Cancer cells producing 
growth factors that trigger the formation of new blood vessels (red), which provide 
oxygen to the tumor. E: Cancer cells producing or not producing (grey) adhesion 
molecules. 
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Figure 2. Non-linear dynamics. Fitness of producer and non-producer cells as a 
function of the fraction of producer cells for different costs of growth factor production 
c. Equilibria (full circles: stable; open circles: unstable) and the direction of the dynamics 
(arrows) are shown. When the cost/benefit ratio of growth factor production (c) is high 
(c=0.2), non-producer cells have a fitness advantage for any fraction of the two types, 
hence their frequency increases over time until the producers are eliminated from the 
population. When the cost is low enough (c=0.05), however, the small advantage of 
having an extra producer (itself) in the group can be enough to confer a net fitness 
advantage to producers when they are at intermediate frequencies; in this case, the 
population can converge to a mixed equilibrium of the two types. 
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Box 1: Glossary 
 
Game theory: the study of strategic interactions 
Strategic interaction: a situation in which the optimal decision depends on the decision 
of some other player (frequency-dependent optimization problems) 
Optimization: the choice of the best set of actions to maximise a payoff function 
Game: the formal description of a strategic interaction; it includes the definition of the 
players, strategies and payoffs. 
Players: the individuals (or cells, or other entities) that adopt strategies and obtain 
payoffs 
Strategy: the decision or type adopted by a player (in biology, the phenotype) 
Payoff: the reward from the outcome of the interaction (in biology, fitness) 
Frequency-dependent selection: natural (clonal) selection in which fitness depends on the 
frequency of other phenotypes in the population  
Clonal selection: natural selection (the preferential survival or the fitter phenotypes) 
within populations of cells 
Evolutionary game theory: game theory applied to evolutionary processes (rational 
decision making is replaced by natural selection; conscious strategies are replaced by 
genetically determined phenotypes). 
Evolutionary dynamics: the change in frequency of strategies over time, possibly leading 
to an equilibrium 
Evolutionary stability: the property of being immune to invasion by a mutant strategy 
Equilibrium: an evolutionarily stable state to which a population converges over time 
Cooperator: a player that pays a cost to produce a benefit for its opponent, or contribute 
to a public good (for example, a growth factor producer) 
Defector: a player that does not produce a benefit for its opponent, or does not contribute 
to a public good (for example, a growth factor nonproducer) 
Pairwise game: a game with only two players 
Multiplayer game: a game with multiple players (which can be made of multiple pairwise 
interactions or a single public goods game) 
Public good: any good that leads to a benefit that can be exploited by cooperators and 
defectors alike. 
Public goods game: a multiplayer game in which the payoff depends on the collective 
decision of multiple players rather than their pairwise interactions.  
Linear benefit: the effect of cooperation on fitness when the sum of the contributions is 
additive (each contribution produces the same increment in benefit) 
Nonlinear benefit: the effect of cooperation on fitness when the sum of the contributions 
is not additive but has increasing or diminishing returns, or both or a more complex 
non-linear function 
 
◼ 
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Box 2: The prisoner’s dilemma 
 
Pairwise games can be described by payoff matrices that list the payoffs of all the possible 
interactions between the two players. In the figure below, two players (red and grey) 
must decide, simultaneously, to either cooperate or defect: mutual cooperation rewards 
both with 3 points, whereas mutual defection leads to only 1 point each; if only one 
player cooperates he gets 0 points and the defector gets 5 points. The actual entries of 
the matrix do not matter as long the ranking of the payoffs is conserved – this type of 
payoff matrix defines what is generally called the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD)34.  
 
 
 
Mutual cooperation is better (payoffs are higher for both players) than mutual 
defection; hence, one might think, the players should cooperate (this is the traditional – 
but erroneous – explanation of cooperation between cancer cells). If the first player 
cooperates, however, the second player is better off defecting (getting 5 points instead 
of 3); and if the first player defects, the second player is better off defecting too (getting 
1 point instead of 0). So actually, no matter what the other player does, the only rational 
strategy is to defect (the stable outcome of the game can be found simply by looking at 
where the arrows, which describe an increase in payoff for each player, converge). 
However, both players would be better off by choosing mutual cooperation. Hence the 
dilemma. 
 In terms of evolutionary game theory, the plot on the right shows the dynamics of 
the process in a population: the two lines show the fitness of the two strategies 
(cooperation and defection) as a function of the fraction f of cooperators in the 
population. At the extremes, interactions are always either with a cooperator (at f=1) or 
with a defector (at f=0), hence the value of the two functions at those values of f can be 
taken from the matrix on the left. The intermediate values show the frequency-
dependent fitness of the two types. Because the fitness of a defector is always higher 
than the fitness of a co-operator, at the next generation there will be fewer cooperators 
in the population; hence the fraction of cooperators in the population will always decline 
irrespective of the current fraction (the arrow show the direction of the dynamics) and 
the final outcome will be the extinction of cooperation: all players will defect and have 
fitness equal to 1. 
◼ 
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Box 3: The game of chicken 
 
In the game of Chicken37, also called Snowdrift38, or Hawk-Dove game39, two players 
must decide to either share a resource or fight to have exclusive control over it. Sharing 
confers 2 points to each player, whereas if both fight they both get 0 points (for instance 
because the benefit of the resource is offset by the cost of fighting – note that the zero 
here does not mean that the costs and benefits exactly cancel each other; as usual the 
actual values only matters in relation to each other’s rank); but if one player fights and 
the other doesn’t, the fighter gets most of the resource and neither player has a cost (the 
fighter gets 4 and the other player gets 1); hence here it is better to fight if the other 
player does not, and vice-versa – which is the equilibrium of the game. 
 
 
 
One can find the fraction of fighters at equilibrium by equating the payoff of the 
two strategies (the equilibrium is, by definition, the status in which the frequencies of 
the two types do not change). If s is the fraction of sharers in the population, the fitness 
of a sharer is s(2)+(1-s)(1)=1+s because a sharer has payoff 2 when interacting with 
another sharer and 1 when interacting with a fighter; similarly, the fitness of a fighter 
is s(4)+(1-s)(0)=4s; hence at equilibrium (we must have 1+s=4s) we have s=1/3. As we 
can see in the plot on the right above, this is where the fraction of sharers converges in 
the population dynamics of the game: at high frequencies of sharers the fitness of a 
fighter is higher, so fighters will increase in frequency; at low frequencies of sharers, 
however, fighters have lower fitness, hence the sharers will not be eliminated from the 
population.  
A similar logic applies to public goods games that describe the production of 
diffusible growth factors in multi-player interactions with nonlinear benefit effects.  
◼ 
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Box 4: The truel 
 
The most general principle of evolution by natural selection, Darwin’s “survival of the 
fittest”, does not necessarily apply to interactions between more than two players. 
Consider a duel in which two individuals, A and B, shoot at each other, with accuracies 
(probabilities to hit the opponent) a and b respectively. If they shoot at the same time 
and a>b, clearly A has a higher probability of winning the contest. Even in a sequential, 
repeated duel (at the beginning, and after each shot, who shoots next is chosen at 
random) again clearly A has a higher probability of winning the contest. In duels 
between more players, however, this is not necessarily the case. Consider a 3-person 
version of the duel (a “truel”88). Three individuals, A, B and C, shoot at each other with 
accuracies a, b and c respectively (with a>b>c) in a sequential, repeated truel. Who will 
be the most likely to win?  
The answer here is not so simple as in the 2-person duel; one must take a 
strategic decision: whom to shoot at? It is easy to see that one should shoot at the 
opponent whom one prefers not to face in the 2-person duel, because facing a weaker 
opponent confers a higher payoff in a duel: A would prefer a 2-person duel against C 
than against B, hence A should shoot at B; B would prefer a 2-person duel against C 
than against A, hence B should shoot at A; C would prefer prefer a 2-person duel 
against B than against A, hence C should shoot at A. In synthesis, in a 3-person duel, 
the best strategy is to shoot at the strongest opponent: if all three players are still in the 
game, both B and C will shoot at A; A will shoot at B; nobody will shoot at C.  
 Given these considerations, one can calculate the probability of ultimately 
winning the contest for the three types. Straightforward algebra shows that this 
probability is highest for C and lowest for A, unless the differences in skills are 
extremely large. For example, with a=0.8, b=0.6 and c=0.4 the probabilities of winning 
for A, B and C are respectively 30%, 33% and 37%. What seems paradoxical (the 
weakest type can have the highest fitness) is actually the result of rational, strategic 
considerations (it is better to shoot at the strongest opponent). The logic of the theory 
is indisputable, but the result is not intuitive – that is why game theory can help us 
understand complex strategic interactions. 
 Extensions of this game to evolving populations with clonal selection has 
shown89 that three (or more) types can be maintained as a mixed population, potentially 
explaining stable heterogeneity in the absence of fluctuating selection for characters that 
affect direct competition abilities.  
◼ 
 
 
 
 
 
